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WISCONSIN'S PROPOSED YOUTH SERVICE ACT
Each year a large number of youthful offenders are committed
to existing penal institutions. Each year a large number of youthful offenders are released from correctional schools and reformatories. Each year a large number of those previously discharged
are recommitted to these same institutions. It seems like a futile
and costly procedure. Unfortunately, recidivism is the price that
is being paid for a chaotic and ineffective penology. Viewing its
grim statistics,' the question logically arises as to whether or not
the present method of dealing with delinquents and criminals is adequate or efficacious. The answer is obvious. Judges who have had
long experience in dealing with this group of offenders, are recognizing increasingly, that a system is basically unsound which perpetuates a vicious cycle of arrest, imprisonment, rearrest and reimprisonment. Modern methods of treatment and rehabilitation are
being advocated in place of those derived from present concepts of
retributive punishment. Judge Joseph Ulman is one of many who
has voiced his protest against present penal practice, asserting that
the old formula of punishment is fruitless and ineffectual.2 In the
words of Judge Camille Kelly, the time has come when we must
study the offender instead of the offense. Uniformity of law for
uniformity of crime is about as practicable as uniformity of shoes
for uniformity of feet.3
With a view to remedying these evils of mass treatment, the
present session of the Wisconsin Legislature is being asked to consider the adoption of a Youth Service Act, Which has for its purpose service to youth and the prevention and reduction of delinquency, by co-ordinating and developing all activities within the state
which promote the welfare of youth and the successful rehabilitation
of the youthful offender. 4 The proposed Wisconsin act is based on
a Model Act for a Youth Correction Authority which was brought
forth by the Criminal Justice-Youth Committee of the American
Law institute, after two years of painstaking work and research.
The Model Act was adopted by the Council of the American Law
Institute in 1940, which means that it had to run the gamut of
scrutiny of a membership of seven hundred lawyers, judges, and
other persons of national repute. Today California is the only state
1 Sellin,

"Youth and Crime," 9 Law and Contemporary Problems, 581 at 584
(1942) ; Cass, "Youth and Justice," 31 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 270 at 272 (1940).
2 Ulman, "Dead-End Justice," 33 Journal Criminal Law and Criminology, 6 at 8
(1942) "We who sit on the bench and apply the old formula of punishment because no better means are available, are shocked by a realization of our own
futility."
3 34 Journal Criminal Law and Criminology 195 (1943).
4 Bill 169S 58.61 (1947).
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which has by law put the tenets of the Model Act into practice.
Encouraged by the successful results in California, legislatures in
Minnesota and Illinois are also considering a similar act.
The pattern outlined in the Model Act has been followed closely
in the Wisconsin act but some deviations have been made to better
adapt the provisions of the act to local conditions. Whereas the
Model Act provides for the creation of a new administrative body
called the Youth Authority,5 to which committments would be made
by the court, the drafting committee in Wisconsin believed that the
act could best be administered by the Department of Public Welfare.
The California experience has shown that it is wise to utilize existing facilities as much as possible. Hence, the Wisconsin bill creates
the Youth Service Division in the Department of Public Welfare
under a director appointed by the director of the department on the
nomination of the Youth Service Commission for an indefinite term.6
This division has the responsibility of administering the correctional
services to youth provided for in the bill. 7 In addition to the Youth
Service Division, the bill also creates a Youth Service Commission
to consist of eleven members recognized for their interest in the
welfare of youth 8 They are appointed by the governor by and with
the advice and consent of the senate. This commission nominates
the director of the 'Ybuth Service Division, but the appointment is
made by the director of the Department of Public Welfare. Nonadministrative in character, this commission has duties connected only
with prevention of delinquency. A continuous program of delinquency prevention is most essential if- the results achieved by treatment are to be lasting.
It is part of the basic philosophy of the Wisconsin act to do as
little violence to existing law as possible. The process of arrest,
prosecution and conviction is not interfered with. Only post conviction procedure is affected. No right of sentence now possessed
by the committing judge is interfered with or abridged, with one
exception. The bill specifies that all persons under twenty-one years
of age at the time of apprehension, who have been convicted of a
violation of the law for which the maximum penalty is imprisonment
for life or less than life, but more than six months, shall be committed by the court to the Department of Public Welfare.' Committment may also be made to the department by the Juvenile Court.10
5 A.L.I. Official Draft, Sec. 4 (1940).
6Supra, footnote 4, 58.64 (2)).
7 Ibid., 58.66 (13).
8Ibid., 58.64 (I).
(9 Ibid., 58.71 (2a-e).
10 Ibid., 58.69, "When any juvenile is found to be delinquent under the provisions
of chapter 48 and the Juvenile Court does not release such person unconditionally, place him on probation or in a family home or private institution, the
court shall commit such juvenile to the department."
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The present practice has been to commit the offender to a definite
institution provided that he is not discharged unconditionally or placed
on probation. There he must remain for a specified time regardless
of whether or not that institution is equipped to change him into
a safe member of society. This specified period has no relation to
the time required for the rehabilitation of the criminal. Therein lies
one of the glaring deficiencies of the current practice. It is difficult,
if not impossible, for any judge to estimate in advance the amount
of time required to alter human behavior. Hence, the person who
is not treated intelligently and constructively during incarceration will
return to society bitter, hostile and antagonistic.
After committment by the court to the Department of Public
Welfare, a decision is made as to which of the agencies or institutions under its control would be best fitted to treat the individual."Both public and private agencies may be utilized. Thus recognition
is given to the fact that each offender has needs or problems peculiar
to that individual alone. The offender need not be committed to any
institution. 2 Although a special committee of the Bar Association
of New York City, criticized the Model Act on the basis of cost
and the fact that the goal could be accomplished by improving existing
agencies, it recognized that many individuals have been committed
to institutions who should not be there. It is not the fault of the
judges, the Bar Association claims, but the fault of an impersonal
legally circumscribed system.13 The only effect of incarceration of
some individuals has been to enlarge their repertoire of crime .
Mandatory examination after committment of the physical, psychological, educational and social background of the offender is
provided for in the Wisconsin act.' 4 This furnishes the basis on
which intelligent treatment can be predicated. Likewise periodic reexaminations are required to determine whether or not the existing
order should be modified or continued. If no re-examination is made
within a year, the offender is entitled to petition the court for an
order of discharge.' 5 This eliminates the danger of indefinite control over an individual merely because he has been forgotten by the
department. Any person committed to the department is to remain
under its control, subject to certain limitations, 16 so long as in its
judgment such control is necessary for the protection of the public."
Under the present statutory law an offender must be released at the
"Ibid., 58.84 (I).
12Ibid., 58.89 (I).
23 34 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 250 (1943).
'2 Supra, footnote 4, 58.87 (4).
'5 Ibid., 58.87 (4).
26Ibid., 58.91 (I) (2).

:17Ibid., 58.88 (I).
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end of his sentence regardless of the danger to society. John Barker
Waite, in one of his articles on the Youth Correction Authority,"'
cites the example of the Michigan prisoner who was released at the
expiration of his four year sentence, although the prison psychologist
advised against his release because of definite homocidal tendencies.
Within two weeks of his release he had murdered three people. The
public would be protected from such a catastrophe under the act and
still the inalienable rights of the individual are protected. However,
Professor Jeroma Hall inveighs against the arbitrary power granted
under the Model Act.' 9 He contends that a petty wrongdoer might
be incarcerated until the end of his days if the Authority believed
that it was necessary for the protection of society, subject only to. a
vague ill-conceived appeal to a court. He also objects to the substitution of treatment and rehabilitation for punishment on the basis
that punishment is a theraputic agency of first importance. William
Draper Lewis, in answering some of the criticisms of Mr. Hall, points
out that the object of the Model Act is to discharge the person just
as soon as in the opinion of the Authority there is reason to believe
that he can be given full liberty without danger to the public.2 0 The
Wisconsin act as well as the Model Act looks toward the earliest
possible restoration of the offender to society. It is interesting to
note that the provision for indefinite retention objected to by Mr.
Hall has been eliminated from the California act. Under that act
no person can be detained longer than the maximum statutory period
prescribed for the crime of which he was convicted. In Wisconsin
the judge making the committment, may, but is not required, to fix
a maximum term not to exceed the limit otherwise prescribed by
law for the offense.2 1 If the Department of Public Welfare believes
that the release of an offender would be dangerous because of mental
deficiency or other abnormalities, the Wisconsin bill provides that it
may apply to the court for extended control.2 2 A hearing is then
held and the idividual has the right to representation by counsel.
If the court is of the opinion that further control is not justified
the offender is released, otherwise control is extended.
Although the Model act and the Wisconsin act have been criticized
for various reasons, all who have offered objections concede the inefficacy of the present system. Judge John Perkins admits the dire
18 Waite, "The Youth Correction Authority Act," 9 Law and Contemporary Problems, 600 at 613 (1942).
19 Hall, "The Youth Correction Authority Act Progress or Menace," 28 Am.
Bar Assn. Jr. 317 at 318 (1942).
20 Lewis, "The Youth Correction Authority Act a Model," 28 Am. Bar Assn. Jr.,
322 at 323 (1942).
21 Supra, footnote 4, 58.72.
22 Ibid., 58.92.
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need for a changed penology, but he has condemned the Model Act
on the ground that power may be exercised arbitrarily by the Authority, thus jeopardizing individual rights 2 3 One youth convicted
of larceny, he claims, might be committed to an institution, while
another convicted of the same offense, because in the opinion of the
Authority he did not need institutional care, might be discharged.
This he feels would create great bitterness and resentment. Professor
John Waite, in reply to Judge Perkins, points out that even under
the current system, the power of discrimination exists from the very
beginning to the end, and because it exists it may be abused. Juries
if they wish may convict one person and acquit another on the same
evidence; a governor can pardon one criminal and not another; judges
may place one offender on probation and yet incarcerate another for
the same offense. 4
The constitutionality of the Model act has been carefully considered by Mr. Carney Mimms Jr.2 5 In view of the fact that the
Wisconsin act substantially follows the Model Act these considerations regarding constitutionality would be applicable to the Wisconsin
bill. Mr. Mimms emphasizes the fact that a truly indeterminate
sentence law such as that advocated by the Model Act stands as an
original proposition today. There seems never to have been such a
statute in our legislative history. Because the Act affects individual
freedom it will be closely scrutinized. Constitutional objections have
been raised on the basis that an indeterminate sentence is incompatible with the constitutional distribution of governmental powers;
that is, it impairs the judicial power vested by the state constitution
in the courts, it is a delegation of legislative power, and it is not
due process. Considering the objection that it impairs the judicial
power, Mr. Mimms points out that admittedly the legislature has
the power to define crimes and to fix the manner and period of
punishment without infringing the judicial power. It may also give
the courts discretion to fix sentences between certain limits, but as
this right was given to the courts by the legislature it may also be
taken away.2 6 Where the legislature exerts its power to fix the penalty
for crime, the judicial function is only that of pronouncing sentence.
Where the legislature gives the jury the power to fix the sentence,
the judiciary again has no discretion. Directing committment to a
Board or Authority constitutes no greater limitation on the power
23 Perkins, "Defect in the Youth Correction Authority Act," 33 Journal of Crim-

inal La', and Criminology, III at 115 (1942).
Waite, "Judge Perkins' Criticism of the Youth Correction Authority Act,"
25 33 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 293 at 295 (1942).
Mimms, "Indeterminate Control of Offenders Under the Youth Correction
Authority Act; Constitutional Issues," 9 Law and Contemporary Problems
635 (1942).
26 Miller v. State, 149 Ind. 607, 49 N.E. 894 (1898) ; 24 L.R.A. (N.S.) 625 (1908).
24
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of the judiciary Mr. Mimms concludes. If the sentence is limited
to the period prescribed by statute there seems to be no question
regarding the delegation of legislative authority. However, when
the control is extended beyond the maximum provided for by statute
this question is raised. The validity of any grant of discretionary
power to an administrative agency is tested by an inquiry as to the
adequacy of the standard provided to guide the agency's action. Both
the Model Act and the Wisconsin act specify the standard "dangerous
to the public" in addition to the standards of guidance for the reviewing court. This seems to be as definite as that given to many other
administrative bodies.
Mr. Mimms considers that there is greater risk that the act would
be unconstitutional because the indeterminate sentence renders the
punishment so uncertain as to fall within the constitutional prohibition of cruel and unusual 2 7 The objection might be met, however,
with the defense that committment to the Authority is no more subject to condemnation than the so-called habitual offender laws which
have existed as part of our criminal law since 1817. The fact that
the habitual offender has committed several crimes of a serious nature does furnish some basis for curtailing his freedom. Against
this ground of distinction would have to be weighed the protection
accorded the individual under the Act by a periodic reconsideration of his case coupled with a judicial review. A further constitutional question is whether the power conferred on the Authority
would lead to a deprivation of due process. The risk of such an
abuse will not invalidate the act unless it fails to provide adequate
procedural safeguards. In making provision for judicial review of
extension orders, for a hearing, and for representation by counsel,
the act seems to comply with the principal criteria for procedural
due process. In the Minnesota case,28 the hazard of administrative
abuse were called to the attention of the United States Supreme Court
on appeal. The Supreme Court held that while recognizing the danger of a denial of due process in the proceding in question, (analogous to a proceeding under the Youth Correction Authority) they
had no occasion to consider the abuse for none had occurred. They
assumed that the Minnesota Court would protect appellant in every
constitutional right that he possessed. Only the actuality of administrative abuse and not the potentiality would be likely to move a
court to find a denial of procedural due process.
Const. Art. I Sec. 6, "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor shall excessive fines be imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S.
Const. Amend. Art. 1 Sec. 8, "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
28 fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
Minn. ex rel Pearson v. Probate Ct., 309 U.S. 277 (1940) ; State ex rel Pearson
27 Wis.

v. Probate'Ct., 205 Minn. 545; 287 N.W. 297 (1939).
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The provisions of the Wisconsin act are diametrically opposed
to age old concepts of justice which call for equal treatment of all
who commit a given offense. Nevertheless, there is a growing realization that the tradition of punishment and threat of punishment as
a method of building up resistance to criminal inclinations has failed.
The civil law treats a person under twenty-one with a marked paternalistic attitude. Is there any reason why the criminal law should
treat the individual in this manner only until he has reached the
age of sixteen? In most states a youth who has violated any one
of the numerous penal laws is held fully responsible for his crime
and treated according to the same legal procedure as an adult. In
Wisconsin, the Juvenile Court now has concurrent jurisdiction with
the criminal courts over youths between the ages of sixteen and
eighteen, but when the criminal court does take jurisdiction the trial
becomes a criminal one and the sentence is the same as for an adult.2 9
Charles Evans Hughes has described the Model Act as "the most
important constructive suggestion for dealing with the crime problem that has been made since the original probation and Juvenile
Court legislation". 0 Members of the Wisconsin judiciary, among
them Chief Justice M. B. Rosenberry and Justice John D. Wickhem,
have displayed a keen interest in the drafting of the Wisconsin bill.
It would be idealistic to assume that the proposed act will be a panacea
for all crime and delinquency, but it is a step forward into an era
of enlightened justice where the treatment will fit the offender rather
than the punishment fit the crime. In the long run a well planned
and integrated program of Youth Service will pay not only in human
values but in dollars and cents.
ARLENE KENNEDY

2920 Opinion of Atty. Gen., 978 (1931).
3033 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 15 (1942).

